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1 Introduction
Recent research has indicated that perfect household mobility can generate a
disciplinary mechanism which induces individual jurisdictions to internalize in-
terregional externalities caused by transboundary pollution1 . Wellisch (1994,
1995, 2000, Chapter 7) shows that the non-cooperative equilibrium of the en-
vironmental policy game is socially e¢cient, if households are perfectly mobile
and jurisdictions can set a head tax for the residents in the region and also give
non-negative transfers to the residents of other regions.2 Silva (1997), and Hoel
and Shapiro (2000,2003) demonstrate that the decentralized outcome is second
best constrained e¢cient, even when interjurisdictional transfers are ruled out:
given the set of instruments, a social planner, or a central government, can do
no better than local governments.3
The gist of the e¢ciency result presented in the literature lies in the observa-
tion that perfect household mobility levels down regional welfare di¤erences: in
equilibrium no jurisdiction can be better o¤ than any other jurisdiction. Then
socially harmful policies cannot be individually rational. If a jurisdiction tries
to free-ride through transboundary pollution, the resulting welfare di¤erence
triggers immigration. Because ?xed resources, e.g. land or the carrying ca-
pacity of the environment, are scarce, there is congestion, and an increase in
population lowers welfare. Thus household mobility creates a feed-back e¤ect
which eliminates the payo¤s from sel?sh policy. Rational local governments
correctly anticipate this feed-back, and do not even try to free-ride. To put it
di¤erently, due to perfect household mobility, the objectives of di¤erent regions
coincide. One way to visualize the argument is to compare the economy to an
expedition of alpinists, connected by a rope. Because of the rope, the alpinists
have to show solidarity to each other: if one of them falls, the life of the others
is in danger as well. Migration is like a rope connecting countries? and regions?
fortunes together.
The e¢ciency result is established in static models with perfect mobility.
It is not necessarily robust when migration costs and real time dynamics are
introduced. In a recent paper Haavio (2004) demonstrates that the combination
of stock pollution, costly migration and time consistent environmental policies
implies a major departure: Rather than neutralizing distortions from trans-
boundary pollution, household mobility reinforces the incentives to overemit.
Environmental damages are excessive even when pollution is local. Moreover
these intertemporal externalities get worse as the degree of household mobility
increases. As migration costs approach zero (but do not reach it), the econ-
1Transboundary pollution problems have received a great deal of attention in the literature
since the 1970?s. For a recent survey, see e.g. Hoel (1999).
2 In an economy with mobile population, there are two policy goals: the quality of the
environment, and the right regional allocation of population, resulting in production e¢ciency.
Thus two policy instruments are usually needed to reach the social optimum.
3There is also an interesting recent paper by Sandmo and Wildasin (1999). In contrast to
the rest of the literature, however, this paper concentrates entirely on the optimal policies of
a small country. This focus then makes it hard to compare the paper to our model, where the
emphasis is on economywide implications of household mobility.
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omy becomes as distorted as under global pollution. However, if households
are perfectly mobile, the e¢ciency result established in the static literature is
replicated.
Stock pollution introduces the tragedy of the commons4. As consumption
and environmental damages are temporally separated, it is possible to ?rst enjoy
consumption and then escape the damages. This is not feasible in a static model
where bene?ts and costs occur simultaneously. Viewed from another angle, the
pollution stock has the strategic value of curbing future immigration. Sluggish
migration and the requirement of time consistency then eliminate implicit coop-
eration. When migration takes time, the higher consumption today can be fully
enjoyed by current residents. Under perfect household mobility there would be
an immediate surge of immigration, and the extra consumption would be shared
with newcomers. Therefore under imperfect household mobility, unlike under
perfect mobility, there is an incentive to consume more today than is socially
optimal. This incentive, however, exists not just today but at any time in the
future if there is no commitment to a Nash strategy.5
Both in the static literature and in the dynamic model by Haavio (2004) it
is assumed that the pollution rent is collected by the local public sector, which
either uses emission fees or auctions tradable pollution permits. The papers
further stipulate that public authorities treat natives and immigrants equally
when using public funds. These assumptions then introduce open access to the
pollution rents: by immigrating foreigners can get their share.
This paper shows that the choice of policy instruments, and the ensueing
allocation of pollution rents, in?uences the interaction between household mo-
bility and environmental policy. The paper has three interlinked goals. First,
we reinterpret the earlier results in a way which illustrates that open access to
pollution rents is an important element both in the mechanism leading to social
e¢ciency, under perfect household mobility, and in the tragedy of the commons
emerging in dynamic settings with imperfect mobility. Second, we demonstrate
that both the bene?cial e¤ects of perfect household mobility and the harmful
consequences of imperfect mobility vanish, if policy-makers use command and
control, and the pollution rent accrues to natives, who, say, own the local land.
Finally, we show that the e¢ciency and ine¢ciency results are nevertheless in
a certain way robust with respect to alternative assumptions concerning policy
4A tragedy of the commons occurs when property rights over an asset are ill de?ned or
cannot be enforced. Typically, the literature shows that open access leads to overconsumption
and underinvestment. Fisheries are analysed in the classic article by Gordon (1954) and in
Levihari and Mirman (1980). Lancaster (1973) and Tornell and Velasco (1992) study the
accumulation of capital and economic growth in an economy with ill de?ned property rights.
5There is also some empirical evidence suggesting that mobility may encourage people
to disregard their environment. Probably the best-known observations concern the role of
shifting cultivation and nomadism in the process of deforestation in the tropics and in that of
deserti?cation in sub-Saharan Africa. (See e.g. Bilsborrow (1992), Bilsborrow and DeLargy
(1990), Cruz and Cruz (1990), Talbot (1986), Peters (1988)). Other examples where high
demographic turnover and environmental problems have coincided include military bases,
with their regularly changing population, mining communities ) , where people seldom plan
to stay for the rest of their life (see e.g. Smith et al. (1995)), and refugee camps , with
inhabitants waiting for an opportunity to leave(see e.g. UNHCR (1997)).
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instruments and rent allocation. A crucial role of the assumption of open access
to the pollution rent is that it provides a simple way to model congestion: as
immigrants can grab a part of resources, increases in population are bad. If
congestion is directly introduced into the utility function, as in Silva (1997),
both the blessings of perfect household mobility and the detrimental e¤ects of
imperfect mobility reemerge, albeit in a weaker form, even under command and
control.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 develops a one-eriod model
to illustrate that under transboundary pollution and perfect household mobil-
ity, the socially optimal outcome is achieved if the pollution rent is collected by
the local public sector, which redistributes it evenly between all residents (also
new migrants). On the other hand, if command control is used and the rent
accrues natives (who, say own, the local land), household mobility does not pro-
vide a remedy. Section 3 augments the framework to include two periods, and
examines the situation studied in Haavio (2004), with stock pollution, sluggish
migration and time-consistent environmental policy. Also in this case the allo-
cation of pollution rents is crucial. If the rent goes to all residents, household
mobility introduces new distortions; if it accrues to natives, only, there are no
new externalities. Section 4 then shows how the results change, when disutil-
ity from congestion is explicitly introduced: the bene?cial and harmful e¤ects
of household mobility do not disappear even if natives get the pollution rents.
Some concluding remarks are given in Section 5.
2 One-period model
This section studies the potential role of household mobility in internalizing
externalities caused by transboundary pollution. The economy consists of two
countries i = 1; 2. The total population of the economy is ?xed to unity and the
number of consumer-laborers living in country i is denoted by N i. Consumers
are identical and derive utility out of consumption (C) and environmental ameni-
ties (E), U = U(C;E): The representative consumption good is produced by
constant returns to scale, and using labor (N) and pollution emissions (S)
Y i = F (N i; Si) = N if(¾i) (1)
where
¾i =
Si
N i
(In the two-period model, analyzed below, s and S denote ?rst and second
period emissions.) The quality of the environment in country i = 1; 2 is given
by
Ei = ! ¡ (1 ¡ q)Si ¡ qSj
where q 2 [0; 12 ] is the measure of transboundary pollution.
The sequence of moves in the environmental policy migration game is the
following:
3
² (0) At the outset of the game there is an equal number of people in both
countries n1 = n2 = 1
2
.
² (1) The countries set their environmental policies (S1; S2):
² (2) People can migrate from one country to another.
² (3) Production, consumption, pollution.
The social optimum of the model is easy to characterize. There is an equal
number of people in both countries; extra utility from consumption is balanced
by environmental damages:
UCif
0(¾i) = N iUEi (2)
In the absence of household mobility, national policy-makers would ignore dam-
ages occurring abroad and overemit:
UCif
0(¾i) = (1 ¡ q)N iUEi (3)
Next we proceed to decentralized decision making under household mobility.
It turns out that the incentives facing mobile consumers and policy-makers
depend on instrument choice, and on how pollution rents are allocated. Denote
by Cii and C
j
i the consumption of a native of country i = 1; 2, if he stays in
country i and moves to country j 6= i, respectively. A consumer always earns
wages wm = f(¾m)¡¾mf 0(¾m) in the country where he resides. As to pollution
rents ¼m = Nm¾mf 0(¾m), we assume that a share ± 2 [0; 1] is distributed to
current residents, whereas the remaining share (1 ¡ ±) is reserved to natives.
± = 1 corresponds to environmental taxation, combined with equal treatment
of all residents; potential land rents are taxed away and distributed back in
equal shares6. ± = 0 is command and control, with pollution (and land) rents
accruing to natives (who own the land). If an agent stays in his native country
(i) his rent income is ±¾if 0(¾i) + (1 ¡ ±)¾if 0(¾i)N ini . If he migrates to country
j, he receives ±¾jf 0(¾j) + (1 ¡ ±)¾if 0(¾i)N ini . Then we can write
Cii = f(¾
i) ¡ (1 ¡ ±)¾if 0(¾i)[1 ¡ N
i
ni
] (4)
Cji = f(¾
j) ¡ (1 ¡ ±)[¾jf 0(¾j) ¡ ¾if 0(¾i)N
i
ni
] (5)
It is easy to see that only when the pollution rent is taxed and redistrubed by
impartial local authorities (± = 1); Cii ´ Cij ´ f(¾i) and Cjj ´ Cji ´ f(¾j); and
natives and immigrants necessarily get the same level of consumption. It is also
6Land could be easily included into the model as third factor of production. However,
as this would increase notational clutter without changing the qualitative results, we have
decided not to do so.
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useful to analyze how consumption depends on the distribution of population.
In the symmetric equilibrium we have7
@Cii
@N i
= ¡±f 0¾if 0(¾i)=N i · 0 (6)
@Cji
@N i
= ±¾if 0(¾i)=N i ¡ 2(1 ¡ ±)(¾i)2f 00(¾i)=N i > 0 (7)
Notice in particular that immigration decreases the consumption of a represen-
tative native, only if immigrants get a share of pollution rents, ± > 0.
Next we turn to migration. People move from one country to the other only
if it is pro?table to do so. Perfect household mobility implies that
U(Cii ;E
i) ¸ U(Cji ;Ej); i; j 2 f1; 2g; i 6= j (8)
where equality holds if some people migrate from i to j. Notice that in general
(8) does not imply that both countries should necessarily have the same level
of welfare, not even in the case where there actually is migration.8 If ± = 1,
and the rent is collected in taxes, Cii = C
i
j ´ Ci; and we get the more familiar
condition
U(Ci;Ei) = U(Cj ;Ej) (9)
stating that migration equalizes welfare between the two countries. Totally
di¤erentiating (8) tells how an increase in emissions in country i a¤ects migration
?ows. Suppose people migrate from j to i. Then we have
dN i
dSi
=
UCji
@Cij
dSi ¡ (1 ¡ q)UEi + qUEj
UCjj
@Cjj
@Ni ¡ UCij
@Cij
@N i
(10)
Suppose next that people migrate from i to j
dN i
dSi
=
UCii
@Cii
@Si ¡ UCji
@C
j
i
@Si ¡ (1 ¡ q)UEi + qUEj
UCji
@Cji
@N i ¡ UCii
@Cii
@dNi
(11)
In the symmetric equilibrium both (10) and (11) become.
dN i
dSi
=
1
2
±f 0(¾i)=N i ¡ (1 ¡ ±)¾if 00(¾i)=N i ¡ (1 ¡ 2q)UEiU
Ci
i
±¾if 0(¾i)=N i ¡ (1 ¡ ±)(¾i)2f 00(¾i)=N i (12)
If ± = 1 (or q = 1
2
), dN
i
dSi
> 0; and an increase in emissions triggers immigration;
otherwise however the sign is ambiguous.
7 In what follows we also need the relations
@Cii
@Si
= f 0(¾i)=N i; @C
j
i
@Si
= (1 ¡
±)
£
f 0(¾i) + f 00(¾i)¾i
¤
=N i;
@Cj
i
@Sj
=
£
±f 0(¾j) ¡ (1¡ ±)f 00(¾j )¾j¤ =N j and @Cjj
@Si
= 0.
8With arbitrary policies, household mobility does not in general equalize welfare. In the
symmetric equilibrium of the model both countries are of course equally well o¤.
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National policy makers in country i choose Si so as to maximize the welfare
of a representative domestic consumer:
max
Si
U(Cii ;E
i)
When designing their policies, national authorities take into account the e¤ects
on migration (12). The ?rst order condition is
UCii [
@Cii
@Si
+
@Cii
@N i
dNi
dSi
] = (1 ¡ q)UEi
where @C
i
i
@Ni
dNi
dSi is the (potential) co-operation inducing feed-back e¤ect . The
symmetric equilibrium of the game is then characterized by
(1 ¡ 1
2
±)UCii f
0(¾i) =
·
1 ¡ 1
2
¹ ¡ (1 ¡ ¹)q
¸
NiUEi i = 1; 2 (13)
where
¹ =
±f 0(¾i)
±f 0(¾i) ¡ (1 ¡ ±)¾if 00(¾i) ; ¹ 2 [0; 1] (14)
The conditions (13) indicate that the properties of the decentralized outcome
depend crucially on instrument choice and on how pollution rents are allocated.
The equilibrium is e¢cient only when all residents get an equal share of the rent.
Under taxation (or auctioned tradable permits), ± = 1; ¹ = 1; and (13) assumes
the form (2). Under command and control, if the rents accrue to natives only,
we have ± = 0; ¹ = 0 and (13) becomes (3): national policies are as distorted as
under no household mobility.
To interpret the result, remember from (6) that immigration lowers natives?
consumption level only when newcomers get a share of rents. Thus rent-sharing
is also a necessary condition for the feed-back e¤ect to be operative. Likewise,
notice form (8) and (9) that household mobility levels o¤ all regional welfare
di¤erences, only when natives and migrants have the same sources of income,
and thus get the same consumption level. It is well established in the litera-
ture that welfare equalization through migration makes private and social goals
coincide.
The distinction between private access and open access resources provides
yet another key. Due to transboundary pollution, there is open access to the
assimilating capacity of the environment; this then encourages overpollution.
However, if there is perfect household mobility and pollution rents are redis-
tributed to all residents, there is also open access to the fruits of pollution. As
demonstrated by Wellisch (1994,1995,2000), Silva (1997), and Hoel and Shapiro
(2000,2003), under these circumstances of two-sided open access, overpollution
does not pay o¤. However, if natives have (implicit) property rights over pollu-
tion rents, open access is eliminated on the bene?t side, and the incentives to
overpollute remain.
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3 Two-period model
In this section we construct a two period model capturing the essential features
of Haavio (2004).9 As in the previous section, our aim is to illustrate that
instrument choice, and the resulting allocation of pollution rents, matters: If
the rent goes to all residents (also immigrants), household mobility introduces
new distortions; if it accrues to natives (who own the land), there are no new
externalities.
The key ingredients of Haavio (2004) are stock pollution, sluggish migra-
tion and time consistent environmental policy. The assumptions of imperfect
household mobility and constant reoptimization imply that at each moment of
time national decision makers can take the regional distribution of population
as given. Then higher consumption today can be fully enjoyed by current res-
idents. However, there is a link (through state variables) from environmental
policy to future population movements.
The basic setup is as above. The economy consists of two countries, and iden-
tical consumers derive utility out of consumption and environmental amenities.
The economy lasts for two periods; we denote ?rst period variables by lower-case
letters and second period variables by upper-case letters. The trade-o¤ between
?rst period consumption (c) and emissions (s) is10
ci =
si
ni
(15)
Second period production uses technology (1). Finally, intertemporal utility is
given by
u(c; e) + U(C;E)
We assume that there is stock pollution. The quality of the environment in
the ?rst period (e) is exogenous. The quality of second period amenities (E) is
a¤ected by ?rst period emissions (s).
Ei = ! ¡ (1 ¡ q)si ¡ qsj (16)
As E is una¤ected by S, in the second period both countries emit the maximum
amount S1 = S2 = S. Thus in what follows we do not have to analyze second
period environmental policies.
The sequence of events in the environmental policy-migration game is the
following
First period
² (0) At the beginning of the game there is an equal number of people in
both countries. We assume that (i) migration is sluggish and (ii) the
9Haavio (2004) develops a continuous time, in?nete horizon model. Here we try to capture
the essential features of that framework using the simplest possible setup, with two periods.
10As ?rst period population is given, this cake-eating technology can be used without any
loss of generality.
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?rst period (today) is so short that nobody has the time to move.11 ;12
Thus in the ?rst period the regional allocation of people can be taken
as given: n1 = n2 = 12 : This assumption also implies that ?rst period
consumption can be enjoyed by natives, only.13
² (1) The countries choose their ?rst period environmental policies (s1; s2)
² (2) Production and consumption. (Pollution occurs in the second period)
Second period
² (3) People can migrate from one country to another. In our two pe-
riod model, the second period represents the whole future. Thus there is
enough time to move. To keep the model as simple as possible, we do not
introduce shifting costs.
² (4) Production and consumption; damages due to ?rst period emissions.
In the socially optimal outcome, ?rst period environmental policy is charac-
terized by
uci = N
iU iEi (17)
In the absence of household mobility, national policy-makers ignore foreign dam-
ages and overemit
uci = (1 ¡ q)N iU iEi (18)
In particular, under global pollution we have
uci =
1
2
N iU iEi (19)
As in the previous section, the way in which pollution rents are allocated
plays an important role. The connection between the allocation rule and second
period consumption is given by (4) and (5); interpretations are as above. (First
11To keep the model as simple as possible we simply assume that there is no mobility in
the ?rst period. This shortcut could however be justi?ed by a more fullbodied model with
shifting costs. When period becomes short enough, migration approaches zero.
12Given that the ?rst period is short, it may seem odd that the second period pollution stock
is determined by ?rst period emissions, as stated by equation (16). However, our modelling
strategy can be seen, and justi?ed, as a shortcut. We could explicitly introduce the length
of the period h into equation (16), making it Ei = ! ¡ £(1¡ q) si + qsj¤ h. However the
shortness of the period should also show up on the bene?t side, and we should express ?rst
period consumption by ch. But then the h terms appearing on both sides of the maximization
problem cancel out each other, and the basic structure of the problem and its solution remain
unaltered.
13Under perfect household mobility, ?rst period migration would be implicitly de?ned by
the conditions u(cii; e
i) ¸ u(cji ; ej ); i; j 2 f1; 2g; i 6= j . The resulting outcome would be
equivalent to that derived in the previous section: (i) If pollution rents are distributed to all
resident, the decentralized outcome is socially e¢cient. (ii) If the rents accrue to natives only,
perfect household mobility has no e¤ect.
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period consumption is given by (15).) At the beginning of the second period
people choose the location o¤ering the highest second period utility. Then in
equilibrium the condition (8) holds. Totally di¤erentiating we can then see how
?rst period emissions a¤ect migration. In the symmetric equilibrium we have
dN i
dsi
= ¡1
2
(1 ¡ 2q)UEiU
Ci
i
±¾if 0(¾i)=N i ¡ (1 ¡ ±)(¾i)2f 00(¾i)=N i < 0 (20)
Thus an increase in ?rst period emissions discourages second period immigra-
tion.
In the ?rst period national policy makers design their environmental policies
so as to maximize the intertemporal welfare a representative resident
max
si
u(ci; ei) + U(Cii ;E
i)
The ?rst order condition is of the form
uci = (1 ¡ q)N iUEi ¡ UCi @C
i
@N i
dN i
dsi
N i
where the term ¡UCi @Ci@N i dN
i
dsi
Ni captures the distortions due to household mo-
bility: ?rst period emissions provide a means to decrease second period popula-
tion. Then the conditions characterizing the decentralized outcome are of the
form
uci =
·
1 ¡ 1
2
¹ ¡ (1 ¡ ¹)q
¸
N iUEi i = 1; 2 (21)
where ¹ 2 [0; 1] is given by (14).
The conditions (21) indicate that the properties of the decentralized outcome
depend crucially on how pollution rents are allocated. If the rent is taxed away
by local authorities, which treat all residents equally, ± = 1; ¹ = 1 and (21)
becomes (19): the equilibrium is as distorted as under global pollution.14 On
the other hand if command and control is applied, and the rents accrue to
natives ± = 0, ¹ = 0, and household mobility introduces no new distortions.
To interpret the result, remember from (6) that outmigration raises con-
sumption in the source country only when emigrants get a smaller share of
domestic rents than those who stay. Thus a system where the allocation of
rents is (at least partially) conditional on residence is also a necessary condition
for the emergence of new externalities.15
On the other hand the distinction between private and open access provides
a key. As migration is sluggish, current residents have private access to today?s
pollution rents. By contrast, from today?s perspective future rents are subject
14This rather extreme property follows from the assumption that in the second period people
can migrate without incurring any costs. If migration costs were introduced, the resulting
distortions would be less severe.
15To be more precise, this claim holds in a situation where land is owned by natives. It
can be shown that if land is partially in foreign ownership, new externalities arise also under
command and control.
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to open access. Then - even under local pollution - there is an incentive to
emit today more than is socially optimal. However, if pollution rents accrue to
natives only, private access applies also in the future, and the migration-induced
incentives to overemit disappear.
4 Adding a congestion externality
The previous two sections have demonstrated that household mobility has no
e¤ect if pollution rents accrue to natives only. This is because in equilibrium
a small change in population leaves the level of consumption (Cii ) intact; see
expression (6). To put it di¤erently, there is no disutility from congestion. In
this section we show that household mobility is never neutral, if an explicit
congestion externality is introduced.
Following Silva (1997), assume that (second period) utility is given by
U = U(C; E;N)
and UN < 0 so that congestion lowers welfare. Then migration is determined
by the relations
U(Cii ;E
i; N i) ¸ U(Cji ;Ej ;N j) i; j 2 f1; 2g; i 6= j (22)
4.1 One period model
In the symmetric equilibrium of the one period model, the e¤ect of environmen-
tal policy on migration is given by
dN i
dSi
=
1
2
±f 0(¾i)=N i ¡ (1 ¡ ±)¾if 00(¾i)=N i ¡ (1 ¡ 2q)UEiU
Ci
i
±¾if 0(¾i)=N i ¡ (1 ¡ ±)(¾i)2f 00(¾i)=N i ¡ UNi
U
Cii
(23)
When ± = 1 (or q = 1
2
), dN
i
dSi
> 0; otherwise however the sign is ambiguous.
First order conditions characterizing environmental policy then take the form
UCii f
0(¾i) +
·
UCii
@Cii
@N i
+ UN i
¸
dN i
dSi
N i = (1 ¡ q)N iUEi
where dC
i
i
dN i · 0 is given by (6). Now the feed-back e¤ect
h
UCii
@Cii
@N i + UNi
i
dN i
dSi N
i
consists of two parts: immigration may (i) lower consumption and (ii) cause
disutility due to congestion. In the symmetric equilibrium we have
UCi
·
(1 ¡ 1
2
±)f 0(¾i) +
1
2
(1 ¡ b¹)UNi
UCi
Ni
¾i
¸
=
·
1 ¡ (1 ¡ b¹)q ¡ 1
2
b¹¸N iUEi (24)
where
b¹ = ±f 0(¾i)=N i ¡ UNiUCii N
i
¾i
±f 0(¾i)=N i ¡ (1 ¡ ±)¾if 00(¾i)=N i ¡ UNiU
Ci
i
Ni
¾i
; b¹ 2 (0; 1] (25)
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When ± = 1; b¹ = 1 and the decentralized outcome is e¢cient: as migration levels
o¤ all interregional welfare di¤erences, socially non-optimal policies do not pay
o¤. Unlike in the previous sections, household mobility does not become neutral
when natives obtain all rents: with ± = 0 (24) takes the form
UCii
·
f 0(¾i) +
1
2
(1 ¡ b¹)UN i
UCi
N i
¾i
¸
=
·
1 ¡ 1
2
b¹ ¡ (1 ¡ b¹)q¸N iUEi i = 1; 2 (26)
where
b¹ = UNiUCii N
i
¾i
¾if 00(¾i) + UNi
U
Cii
Ni
¾i
; b¹ 2 (0; 1) (27)
When transboundary pollution problems are severe (q is large), household mo-
bility always decreases equilibrium emission. For example under global pollu-
tion, q = 1
2
, (24) takes the form UCii
h
f 0(¾i) + 1
2
(1 ¡ b¹)UNi
UCi
N i
¾i
i
= (1¡q)N iUEi .
Due to immigration and congestion, household mobility lowers national bene?ts
from pollution, while national costs remain intact; thus equilibrium emissions
decrease. However, with less transboundary pollution the mobility of people
may sometimes actually increase emissions. As an example consider the case
with local pollution, q = 0. With no household mobility the decentralized out-
come would be socially optimal. Now the ?rst order condition (24) becomes
UCii
h
f 0(¾i) + 12(1 ¡ b¹)UNiUCi N i¾i i = (1 ¡ 12 b¹)N iUEi . If ¡¾if 00(¾i) (the e¤ect of
an emission increase on wages) is small, b¹ ¼ 1. Then national bene?ts from
pollution fall proportionally less than national costs, and as a result emissions
increase. To understand this perhaps somewhat paradoxical ?nding, notice from
(23) that when ± = 0; and q and ¡¾if 00(¾i) are small, an increase in emissions
triggers outmigration. Then a country may overemit to alleviate congestion.16
4.2 Two period model
In the symmetric equilibrium of the two period model, the e¤ect of ?rst period
environmental policy on second period migration is given by
dN i
dsi
= ¡1
2
(1 ¡ 2q)UEi
UCi
i
±¾if 0(¾i)=N i ¡ (1 ¡ ±)(¾i)2f 00(¾i)=N i ¡ UNi
U
Cii
< 0
16With local pollution, an increase in emissions has three e¤ects. (i) The domestic pollution
rent increses. With ± = 0 all natives (also emigrants) get an equal share of the rent. (ii)
Domestic wages rise. (iii) The domestic environment becomes more polluted. Now we can
draw the following conclusions. (a) If (ii) is weak compared to (iii) an increase in emissions
triggers outmigration. (b) As emigrants get their share of the pollution rent, an increase in
emissions, ceteris paribus, raises their welfare.(c) In equilibrium the welfare of emigrants and
those who stay must be the same. (d) Due to congestion externalities, outmigration raises
domestic welfare. (e) Thus if emissions trigger outmigration, it is optimal to overemit.
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and ?rst period emissions decrease second period immigration. The ?rst order
conditions characterizing decentralized environmental policy then take the form
uci = (1 ¡ q)NiUEi ¡
·
UCii
@Cii
@N i
+ UNi
¸
dN i
dsi
Ni
The term ¡
h
UCii
@Cii
@N i + UNi
i
dN i
dsi N
i capturing new distortions consists of two
elements: a smaller second period population (i) increases per capita consump-
tion and (ii) decreases disutility due to congestion. In the symmetric equilibrium
we have
uci =
·
1 ¡ 1
2
b¹ ¡ q(1 ¡ b¹)¸N iUEi i = 1; 2 (28)
where b¹ is given by (25). If ± = 1, b¹ = 1, and national policies are as distorted
as under global pollution: when the pollution rent is collected by the local pub-
lic sector, we get the same result as above in Section 3. ± = 0; corresponding
to command and control, is the more interesting case. When UN i < 0; we can
conclude from (27) that b¹ > 0. Thus as long as there are congestion externali-
ties, the exacerbated incentives to overemit do not vanish when pollution rents
accrue to natives
5 Concluding remarks
Recent research has shown that while perfect household mobility may induce
individual jurisdictions to internalize interregional externalities caused by trans-
boundary pollution, the combination of imperfect mobility and real time dynam-
ics may quite the contrary be harmful for the environment. These results are
obtained by assuming that the pollution rent is collected by the local public
sector, which treats natives and immigrants equally.
This paper demonstrated that the choice of policy instruments and the allo-
cation of pollution rents in?uences the interaction between household mobility
and environmental policy. The message of the paper was threefold. First we
illustrated that the assumption that there is open access to pollution rents is a
crucial element both in implicit cooperation, emerging under perfect mobility,
and the tragedy of the commons, generated in dynamic settings by imperfect
mobility. Second, we showed that both the bene?cial and the harmful e¤ects of
household mobility vanish, if pollution rents accrue to natives only, and open
access is eliminated. Third, we demonstrated that the results obtained in ear-
lier studies are however robust in a certain sense: if disutility from congestion
is directly modeled, household mobility is never neutral.
References
[1] Bilsborrow, R. (1992): Population Growth, Internal Migration , and Envi-
ronmental Degradation in Rural Areas of Developing Countries. European
Journal of Population 8, 125-148.
12
[2] Bilsborrow, R. and DeLargy, P. (1990): Land Use, Migration, and Natural
Resource Deterioration: The Experience of Guatemala and the Sudan. Pop-
ulation and Development Review 16, 125-147.
[3] Blomquist, G., Berger, M. and Hoehn, J. (1988): New Estimates of the
Quality of Life in Urban Areas, American Economic Review 78, 89-107.
[4] Cruz, W. and Cruz, M. (1990): Population Pressure and Deforestation in
the Philippines. ASEAN Economic Bulletin 7, 200-212.
[5] Gordon, H. (1954): The Economic Theory of a Common-property Re-
source: The Fishery. Journal of Political Economy 62, 124-142.
[6] Graves, P. (1979): A Life-Cycle Empirical Analysis of Migration and Cli-
mate, by Race. Journal of Urban Economics 6, 135-147.
[7] Haavio, M. (2004): Transboundary Pollution and Household Mobility: Are
They Equivalent? Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
forthcoming
[8] Hoel, M. (1999): Transboundary Environmental Problems. In van der Berg,
J.(ed.): Handbook of Environmental and Resource Economics, Edward El-
gar.
[9] Hoel, M. and Shapiro, P. (2000): Transboundary Environmental Problems
with a Mobile Population: Is There a Need for Central Policy? Department
of Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara, Working Paper
5/2000.
[10] Hoel, M. and Shapiro, P. (2003): Population Mobility and Transboundary
Environmental Problems. Journal of Public Economics 87, 113-124.
[11] Lancaster, K. (1973): The Dynamic Ine¢ciency of Capitalism. Journal of
Political Economy 81, 1092-1109.
[12] Levihari, D. and Mirman, L. (1980): The Great Fish War. Bell Journal of
Economics 11, 322-334.
[13] Mansoorian, A. and Myers, G. (1993): Attachment to Home and E¢cient
Purchases of Population in a Fiscal Externality Economy. Journal of Public
Economics 52, 117-132.
[14] Mueser, P. and Graves, P. (1995): Examining the Role of Economic Op-
portunity and Amenities in Explaining Population Redistribution. Journal
of Urban Economics 37, 176-200.
[15] Sandmo, A. and Wildasin D. (1999): Taxation, Migration and Pollution.
International Tax and Public Finance 6, 39-61.
13
[16] Silva, E. (1997): Decentralized and E¢cient Control of Transboundary
Pollution in Federal Systems. Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management 32, 95-108.
[17] Smith, N., Serrão, E., Alvim, P. and Falesi, I. (1995): Amazonia - Resiliency
and Dynamism of the Land and its People. The United Nations University
Press, Tokyo.
[18] Talbot, L. (1986): Demographic Factors in Resource Depletion and Envi-
ronmental Degradation in East African Rangeland. Population and Devel-
opment Review 12, 441- 451.
[19] Tornell, A. and Velasco, A. (1992): The Tragedy of the Commons and
Economic Growth: Why Does Capital Flow from Poor to Rich Countries?
Journal of Political Economy 100, 1208-1231.
[20] UNHCR (1997): Refugees and the Environment. Caring for the Future.
UNHCR, Geneva.
[21] Wellisch, D. (1994): Interregional Spillovers in the Presence of Perfect and
Imperfect Household Mobility. Journal of Public Economics 55, 167-184.
[22] Wellisch, D. (1995): Can Household Mobility Solve Basic Environmental
Problems? International Tax and Public Finance 2, 245-260.
[23] Wellisch, D. (2000): Theory of Public Finance in a Federal State. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, UK.
14
